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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 05/02/2011

Accident number: 588

Accident time: 14:10

Accident Date: 04/07/2008

Where it occurred: Central Demolition Site
(CDS), Magwi County,
Eastern Equatoria
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Handling accident

Country: Sudan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)
Date of main report: 11/07/2008

ID original source: Juba A/01of 2008

Name of source: UNMAO

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: Propellent and
projectile

Ground condition: demolition site
(explosives)
Date last modified: 05/02/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east: E 31° 59' 21.0.

Map north: N 03° 48' 35.6"

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in 2008. The cover letter of an UNMAO
independent investigation was supplied, but with no accompanying report apart from the
demining group’s internal investigation (which appears to have been accepted by UNMAO).
The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost. Text in
square brackets [ ] is editorial.

United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO), Juba Office, Independent Accident
Investigation – UNMAO/[Demining group]/Juba A/01of 2008
Introduction
1. In accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG’s), the UNMAO
Deputy Programme Manager issued a written convening order on the 5th July 2008 to
investigate an incident resulting in injury to [Demining group] international consultant, [Name
removed].
2. The incident occurred at approximately 1400 hours on Friday 4th July 2008 at a [Demining
group] Central Demolition Site (CDS) in Loa. This report is based on an interview with [the
Victim] at Level II hospital Juba, conducted by the UNMAO investigating officer on 5th July
2008, and a [Demining group] internal investigation report into the incident, presented by the
[Demining group] Operations and Information Officer, [Name removed].
Summary
3. Notwithstanding the initial statement taken from [the Victim], I find that the Internal
Investigation conducted by [the Demining group] to be open, honest and transparent. It
represents an accurate account on the events if the day that lead to the injuries sustained by
[the Victim].
4. Recommendations made in the internal investigation report should be reviewed and acted
upon where necessary.
Signed: [Name removed], QA Officer Juba, Investigation Officer, 17 July 2008
Attached: [Demining group] Internal Investigation and supporting documentation [No
supporting documentation was made available.]

Demining group’s internal investigation report
[Demining group], SOUTH SUDAN MINE/UXO ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
REPORT
Reference:
A. [Demining group] Sudan Internal Investigation Convening Order No. [Demining
group]SUDAN 01/08 dated 5 Jul 08
B. Amendment to Convening Order dated 10 July 2008 Part One - Introduction
Investigation Team
1. [Name removed], [Demining group] Operations Manager
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2. [Name removed], [Demining group] Operations, Information & Liaison Officer (under
instruction)
3. [Name removed], [Demining group] EOD Team Leader (under instruction). Subsequently
removed from the team when it became apparent that he was also a witness to certain events
connected with the accident. See amendment to Convening Order dated [sic].
Location of Accident:
Loa area, Magwi County, Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan
Coordinates: N 03° 48’ 35.6”, E 31 ° 59’ 21.0.
Date and time of Accident:
14.10 (approx), 4 July 2008
Executive Summary
[The Victim] was carrying out an unauthorised experiment with UXO near the [Demining
group] Central Demolition Site at Loa, South Sudan. Contrary to SOPs he was attempting to
burn out some High Explosive filling which was remaining in an item of UXO using propellant
from a 23mm cartridge case. He was using matches directly onto the propellant to initiate the
burn. Although the explosive filling was in an “open” casing of the UXO, it burned to
detonation which fragmented the casing and resulted in a piece of metal going into the right
leg, calf muscle area of [the Victim].
[The Victim] is not from a military background and is a former paramedic. He has completed a
similar EOD course as the Team Leaders he is advising and has insufficient knowledge to be
conducting any experiment, even though he obviously has first world background knowledge
to supplement this lack of experience.
It is considered unnecessary to amend either [Demining group] SOPs or NTSGs as this was
the actions of an individual’s contrary to SOPs, without authorisation and the minimum team
requirements for any EOD task as already stated in SOPs.
The credibility of [Demining group] advisors has been adversely affected by this accident
within [Demining group] operational staff, UNMAO, SSMAA and SPLA/Local authorities in
Loa.
Part Two - DETAILS OF ACCIDENT / INCIDENT
On the 4 Jul 08 [The Victim] remained at the [Demining group] base camp in Loa to assist the
departure of the other [Demining group] Technical Advisor, [Name removed] and [Demining
group] teams who were scheduled to deploy to Magwi.
In the meantime, the two EOD teams remaining in Loa (Teams 2 & 4) deployed as one unit,
as the Team leader (TL) of EOD Team 4 was ill, to the area where we conduct the burning of
Small Arms Ammunition (SAA).
[The Victim] left the camp at approximately 10.45 after informing the Senior Medic, [Name
removed] that he was going to go to the area where the teams were burning SAA.
He arrived at the burning area at about 11.00 and after observing the activities of the team he
informed TL, [Name removed] that he was now going to the CDS to plan and prepare the
UXO for the demolitions for the following day.
In addition to planning and organising piles UXO for the demolition, [the Victim] took it upon
himself to conduct a burning experiment. The teams frequently come across large calibre
UXO which have already had most of the explosive content removed; however, there is

3

normally a small amount of filling remaining and the projectiles cannot be certified as being
free from explosives. [The Victim] stated he was trying to find a simple method to destroy
these or remove the filling, thus making them free from explosive without having to use large
quantities of demolition explosives.
There was part of a recoilless projectile, with the tail spigot broken off and only rear part of the
projectile body remaining, at the CDS. He stuck the tail spigot part in the ground and then
emptied the propellant from a corroded 23mm cartridge case onto the explosive filling. At that
stage he had no matches with him to light the propellant.
At approximately 13.15 [the Victim] returned to the camp and asked the cook at the kitchen
and asked for a box of matches. He had his lunch at the camp during which time the cook
gave [the Victim] a box of matches. At approximately 13.40 [the Victim] left the camp having
informed [the Medic] he was going to the CDS.
During the time [the Victim] was having his lunch at camp, a woman reported some items of
UXO to Teams 2 & 4 who were still at the burning area. They investigated the items and
found they were unfired 82mm mortars and the team decided to take them to the CDS. [The
Victim] was not at the CDS when they arrived there. While they placed the mortars inside the
“taped-off” UXO storage area they noticed the recoilless projectile with the tail spigot stuck in
the ground and the open end that had been filled with grains of propellant. This was about 6
metres away from the UXO holding area.
The teams left the area and on reaching the main road at approximately 13.45 and about 1
km from the CDS they met [the Victim] on his way back to the CDS. He asked them what they
were doing and the TL informed him. Subsequently the team continued back to camp and [the
Victim] proceeded to the CDS.
When [the Victim] arrived back at the CDS he ignited the propellant with a match and this in
turn caused the filling to burn to detonation and fragment the casing. In [the Victim]’s
statement he says he checked the result of this burn, thought it had been successful and that
had gone back to sorting out UXO at the CDS storage area into piles for future demolition
when the recoilless round exploded. He was hit in the leg by a high velocity fragment and
applied a field dressing onto the wound before making his way to the vehicle and driving back
to camp.
At approximately 14.30 [the Victim] drove into the camp and shouted for the [Name removed]
the Senior Medic. [The Medic] attended to him and bandaged his right calf.
[The Victim] telephoned [Name removed], the operations manager who on hearing from [the
Victim] that there might be a piece of fragment still in his leg advised him to go to the closest
hospital at Nimule.
After several minutes [the Victim] rung back and advised the Ops Manager that they were
going to Juba. It transpired later that they had telephoned the hospital in Nimule and found
out that X-ray facilities were not available.
[The Operations Manager] advised them that they would have to get an SPLA escort back to
Juba as the area is at Security level 3. They went to visit the SPLA and at sometime during
[the Victim]’s conversation with an SPLA Captain [Name removed] the conversation was
actually interpreted that [the Victim] might have been shot. The SPLA were understandably
concerned as there are several SPLA units in the area in addition to suspected other armed
groups.
When [the Victim] and escort continued their journey to Juba the TL, [Name removed] and
SPLA Capt [Name removed] went to the CDS to look around and to see if they could
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determine what caused the accident. This was done at the request of the SPLA as they were
concerned that it was indeed a shooting as interpreted at the time of [the Victim]’s meeting
with the Capt [Name removed] requesting an escort to Juba.
[The TL] and Capt [Name removed] saw the seat of an explosion where there was still
blackened soil; the hole where the tail piece of the projectile had been placed in the ground
was then still visible. They were also able to see where the blood trail started at about 6
metres from the explosion area. They photographed the site where [the Victim] applied a field
dressing to the wound.
The investigating officer visited the UXO storage area where [the Victim] said he had been
working at the time of the accident/explosion. The four piles of UXO were where he said they
were, but there was no evidence of an explosion inside the UXO storage area.
During this investigation on Tuesday 8 Jul there was no evidence of blood remaining on the
ground as there had been heavy rain the previous day and evening. The bandage wrapping
was still where it had been dropped.
Part three – ACCIDENT SITE CONDITIONS
The area where the accident took place is flat, clear of vegetation but the surrounding area is
full of dense bush.
The weather at the time was sunny, no wind and clear blue sky.
Part four – TEAM AND TASK DETAILS
The Technical Advisor, [the Victim] was alone in the area.
[The Victim] is a former paramedic who became a Technical Advisor after completing a Level
3 EOD course at IMATC in Nairobi in March 2007
The teams in Loa had been externally QA monitored in June 08 by [Name removed], UNMAO
QA officer and achieved a satisfactory report.
The tasking in Loa is SS-473 – GMAA and UXO Clearance Task of the area
See statements of [the Victim], [Name removed] and [Senior Medic] (attached)
Part five – EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES USED
No equipment was being used at the time of the accident and PPE was not being worn. The
procedure used was not in either [Demining group] SOPs or NTSGs.
The normal operational phase is from the 1st to the 22nd of every month with a stand-down
from 23rd to the end of the month.
Teams and TAs usually leave camp at 07.30 in the morning and return to camp from 14.30
onwards. This is flexible depending on the location and the actual task.
[The Victim] had been on R&R from the 14–21 June 08.
Part six – EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS INVOLVED
The UXO involved were a Recoilless Projectile BK-881 and 23mm projectile propellant.
The recoilless round was incomplete – tail spigot broken off, no fuse and the forward section
of the main body was also broken off and missing.
The propellant was in granular/pellet form which is the same as that found in the cartridge
case of a 23mm projectile.
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[Name removed] witnessed the projectile with the tail part stuck in the ground and with the
open part of the projectile uppermost and filled with propellant granules prior to the accident.
On the day of the investigation the area was still blackened by the explosion, there were still
23mm propellant granules in the vicinity of the blackened area.
Part seven – DETAILS OF INJURIES
Injured person- [the Victim] suffered a single fragment wound to his right calf. There were no
other persons involved or in the vicinity. He was admitted to the UNMIS Level 2 hospital in
Juba where he underwent surgery but they were unable to remove the fragment. [The Victim]
was subsequently taken to Nairobi by air ambulance and to the Aga Khan hospital where
surgeon’s removed the fragment
Part eight – EQUIPMENT/PROPERTY/INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE
No damage was sustained to any equipment
Part nine – MEDICAL AND EMERGENCY SUPPORT
DATE: 4 Jul 2008
14.10 Time of Accident
14.12 (estimated) - [the Victim] applies a field dressing to the wound. He stated that he tried
to call the team on VHF with no response.
14.30 [the Victim] drives to camp and calls for [the Senior medic] who examines and dresses
the wound
14.35-45 [the Victim] telephones the Operations Manager 14.45 Nimule hospital contacted
but no X-ray facility
14.55 [the Victim] and [the Senior Medic] travel to the nearby SPLA camp to request a SPLA
armed escort for journey to Juba
15.45 Travel to Juba in [Demining group] vehicles
18.30 Vehicles arrives at [Demining group] office in Juba
18.40 Vehicles arrives at UNMIS camp in Juba
19.00 Onwards:
Taken initially to the Bangladesh Battalion (BanBat) demining company medical facility
Referred to Level 2 hospital at UNMIS by BANBAT medical staff
Surgery in an attempt to remove the fragment
22.00 (approx) Operations Manager advised by the CO of UNMIS Level 2 hospital that air
evacuation would be required the following day because they could not remove a metal
fragment
DATE: 5 Jul 2008
12.05 Air Ambulance arrives in Juba
12.40 Air Ambulance departs Juba after pilot files flight plan
Date: 12 Jul 2008
[The Victim] re-interviewed at Aga Khan hospital in Nairobi and he writes a second short
statement that now supersedes his original statement made in the UNMIS Level 2 hospital on
5 July 08
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[The Victim] is discharged from hospital and with his wife is conveyed by ambulance to Jomo
Kenyatta international airport and flown back to UK
Note:
1. It is fortuitous that the [Name removed], Deputy Programme Manager, UNMAO was able
to assist in having [the Victim] admitted to the UNMIS medical facility to deal with the wound
as [Demining group] personnel are not authorised to receive treatment in this facility.
2. A letter of entitlement should be sought for access to the UNMIS facility in case of future
emergencies
3. The medical insurance company CEGA was initially informed at 1649hrs on 4 July and
were kept informed on all events. CEGA entered into direct contact with UNMIS doctors and
made all the air ambulance and subsequent medical arrangements.
Part ten – REPORTING PROCEDURES
The reporting requirements were carried out IAW [Demining group] SOPs
1. The initial accident report was sent at 15.45 on 4 Jul 08
2. The interim report was sent at 15.08 on 5 Jul 08
Part eleven – SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
DATE: 4 July 2008
14.10 Time of Accident
14.12(estimated) - [the Victim] applies a field dressing to the wound. He stated that he tried to
call the team on VHF with no response.
14.30 [the Victim] drives to camp and shouts for medic- [the Medic] examines and treats the
wound 14.35 [the Victim] telephones OM
14.35-45 Nimule hospital contacted- no X-ray facility
14.55 Travel to SPLA to seek SPLA armed escort for journey to Juba
15.45 Drive to Juba
18.00 SPLA Capt [Name removed] and TL 2 visit accident site
18.30 Vehicles with [the Victim] and escort arrives at [Demining group] office in Juba
18.45 Vehicles arrive at UNMIS camp in Juba. UNMAO Deputy Programme Manager
contacted and he escorted vehicles into the UNMIS camp.
19.00 [the Victim] taken to BANBAT demining company medical facility for cleaning and
assessment of wound and was then referred to Level 2 hospital at UNMIS.
After various discussions with doctors [the Victim] was taken to the x-ray department and
afterwards into the operating theatre. The surgeon was unable to remove the fragment as
they could only use a local anaesthetic because the UNMIS anaesthetist had gone to
Khartoum. They had to cut the calf muscle to relief pressure from the internal bleeding. The
hospital also requested a blood donor (blood group B -ve) and [Name removed] volunteered
as he had the same blood group.
22.00 (approx) Advised by CO of Level 2 hospital that air evacuation would be required the
following day because they could not remove a metal fragment
DATE: 5 Jul 2008
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[Name removed] and Capt [Name removed] visit site
12.05 Air Ambulance arrives in Juba
12.40 Air Ambulance departs Juba after pilot files flight plan
DATE: 7 July 2008
Investigation team travel with armed escort from Juba to Loa
DATE: 8 July 2008
Investigation team visit site of accident
DATE: 9 July 2008 Accident report writing DATE: 11 July 2008
Operations Manager travels from Loa to Juba with armed escort.
DATE: 12 July 2008
Operations Manager travels to Nairobi and re-interviews [the Victim] and obtains another
statement
Part twelve – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
[The Victim] did not admit to carrying out this unauthorised experiment until he was reinterviewed in Nairobi and presented with the investigation evidence.
There was confusion and problems regarding the [Demining group] entitlement to access the
UNMIS Levels 1 & 2 medical facilities. [Demining group] Medevac SOPs state that we should
go to Unity in the first instance, however their resources to stabilise a potentially serious
accident victim prior to air evacuation are limited. The Operations Manager contacted [Name
removed] whose timely intervention made it possible for [the Victim] to be admitted to UNMIS
facilities.
The credibility of [Demining group] as an organization and that of the Technical Advisors has
been adversely affected within the national staff, UNMAO, SSMAA, SPLA and local
authorities.
Recommendations
[Demining group] should request a formal agreement to afford [Demining group] expatriate
staff access to UNMIS Level 1 & 2 medical facilities, especially in case of accident or illness
emergencies. [Demining group] has two signed agreements, with UNMAS and UNHCR with a
third UNDP contract likely in the near future.
It is recommended that [the Victim] is not employed as a [Demining group] Technical Advisor
in Sudan after his convalescence.
[Demining group] should conduct a confidence building exercise involving staff with the
objective of reviving the professional credibility of [Demining group] TAs.
[Demining group] should review recruitment procedures to ensure that TAs with appropriate
qualifications and experience are employed.
The curriculum and experiential development qualities of the IMAS Level 2 and 3 courses
currently run at IMATC, Nairobi should be reviewed. This accident and subsequent
investigation suggest that the courses are not sufficient to produce an expatriate Technical
Advisor; rather it produces a Team Leader. The courses could, however, be utilised as
refresher training for experienced international EOD operators should it be necessary.
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Signed [Name removed], {Demining group] Operations Manager
14 July 2008 Annexes: [Not made available]
A.

Copy of Initial Accident Report

B.

Witness Statements

1.

[the Victim]

2.

[Senior Medic]

3.

[Team Leader]

C.

Site and Technical Photographs

D.

IMSMA Demining Accident Report

E.

Convening Order and TOR

Victim Report
Victim number: 772

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: 5 hours

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: None

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Leg
COMMENT: No formal medical report was made available.
The Victim had surgery to remove a single fragment from his leg. A first attempt at surgery to
do this was reported unsuccessful (9:50 hrs after the accident) and a second attempt was
successful more than 24 hours after the accident.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because, as the Demining
Group recognised in its investigation, the Victim’s EOD training had not prepared him
appropriately, and seems to have given him an unjustified confidence without the required
competencies. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management Control Inadequacy”
because it was the management’s responsibility to train and control its field representatives.
The Demining Group’s internal investigation appears to have been conducted with
commendable transparency and its responses to have been both reasonable and humane, so
correcting its management inadequacy with professionalism.
This accident is recorded under “Notes” as having “No independent investigation available”
because the UNMAO QA officer’s “report” does not constitute any kind of investigation. That
said, the apparent quality of the internal investigation is so unusually high that an independent
investigation may have been a waste of resources.
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